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Summary 
While the EU has recently upgraded its external 
democracy promotion policies through a set of 
initiatives such as the “Partnership for Democracy and 
Shared Prosperity with the Southern Mediterranean”, 
the proposal for a “European Endowment of 
Democracy”, and the “Strategic Framework and 
Action Plan on Human Rights and Democracy”, there 
is one challenge that it has not yet addressed: what 
exactly does it aim to support?  
This policy brief illustrates that both the 
conceptualisation of democracy and the means to 
achieve it remain vague, and explains why this is 
problematic. It points out the risks that stem from a 
lack of clear understanding about how human rights, 
governance, civil society and socio-economic 
development relate to democratisation. It concludes that 
the EU should reflect on the substance of its external 
democracy promotion policies and conceptualise the 
relationship between the different elements of 
democracy promotion cited above and democratisation. 
While ongoing reforms of international democracy 
promotion should continue, a wider debate on 
substance could help identify what the EU should 
support in the future. The EU should also establish a 
reflective external democracy promotion policy where 
the assessment of actions on democratic development 
becomes systematic and is institutionalised.1 
                                                     
1This policy brief draws on an international research 
project on the substance of EU democracy promotion, 
EU democracy promotion is vague 
For more than two decades, the European Union 
(EU) has committed itself to promoting 
democracy in other parts of the world.2 Its 
democracy promotion profile has been 
strengthened since the historic developments in 
the Arab world, as witnessed by the EU’s launch 
of the ‘deep democracy’ concept, the proposal for 
a European Endowment of Democracy, and the 
new Framework and Action Plan on Human 
Rights and Democracy Promotion.3 New 
momentum for democracy promotion also comes 
from the EU’s own critical assessment that its 
                                                                                           
involving inter alia a special issue of the European Foreign 
Affairs Review (2011, 5) and an expert meeting at CEPS on 
2 July 2012. We are grateful to the EU for its funding of a 
Jean Monnet Information and Research Activity and to 
CEPS for its organisational support. We would also like to 
thank all the authors and participants involved in the 
project for their valuable insights, in particular Fabienne 
Bossuyt, Eline de Ridder, Vicky Reynaert, Steven 
Blockmans and Michael Emerson. The responsibility for 
this policy brief lies solely with the authors. 
2The EU uses ‘democracy promotion’, ‘democracy 
support’ and ‘democracy building’ interchangeably. We 
use the term ‘EU’ here, even if, strictly speaking, the 
European Commission or the EEAS are concerned. 
3 The Council of the EU, Council Conclusions on the 
European Endowment for Democracy, Brussels, 1.12.2011; 
Council of the EU, EU Strategic Framework and Action 
Plan on Human Rights and Democracy, Luxembourg, 
25.6. 2012. 
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policies were too accommodating of authoritarian 
regimes. One challenge remains, however, which 
will be addressed in this policy brief: despite the 
high and growing importance of democracy in the 
EU’s external actions, what the EU aims to 
support is still unclear.  
At the conceptual level, attempts to draw up a 
‘European Consensus on Democracy’, have failed 
to bear fruit. The ‘deep democracy’ concept has 
been defined in various and rather vague terms.4 
For instance, more ‘formal’ descriptions focusing 
on rules and rights can be contrasted with more 
‘substantial’ understandings that take into account 
the level of maturity of democratic practice. While 
there seems to be a core of common elements in 
the formal notions, there are also some notable 
differences, such as with respect to the right to 
form political parties or freedom of religion. In her 
speeches, the EU High Representative for Foreign 
Affairs and Security Policy Catherine Ashton 
sometimes adds elements not mentioned in the 
documents, such as gender equality and private 
investment, and civil society is sometimes 
mentioned, sometimes not. The most recent EU 
Strategic Framework and Action Plan on Human 
Rights and Democracy do not elaborate on the 
substance of what should be promoted and 
remain conspicuously silent on the notion of deep 
democracy. Even the enlargement process with 
Central and Eastern Europe, which is often 
considered as a prime example of successful EU 
democracy promotion, demonstrated the 
vagueness and inconsistencies that characterise 
the EU’s views on democracy.5 This has led 
commentator Milja Kurki to conclude that in fact 
different meanings of democracy coexist and even 
conflict with each other, creating a situation of 
conceptual fuzziness.6 
If we move away from concepts and towards the 
EU’s democracy promotion activities in practice, 
the fog refuses to lift. Scholars come to different 
                                                     
4 According to Michael Emerson, the concept was 
invented in the wake of the crisis in Tunisia to hide the 
fact that the EU did not have a democracy agenda at all in 
MENA. M. Emerson at the public forum, Brussels, 2 July. 
5 E. De Ridder and D. Kochenov (2011),“Democratic 
Conditionality in the Eastern Enlargement: Ambitious 
Window Dressing”, European Foreign Affairs 
Review(EFAR), 16(5), pp. 589-605. 
6 M. Kurki (2012 forthcoming), Democratic Futures: Re-
visioning Democracy Promotion and Democratization, 
London: Routledge. 
conclusions about the content of EU democracy 
promotion and have defined it variously as 
‘social’, ‘electoral’, ‘consenting’, ‘embedded’, 
‘shallow’ or ‘neoliberal’. While some argue that 
the EU’s primary focus is on elections, for 
example, others contend that election support is 
only a marginal element of EU democracy 
promotion efforts. And while some authors see a 
social democratic European model being exported 
abroad, others stress that EU democracy 
promotion policies support a neoliberal market 
model rather than political rights.  
The ambiguity about whether the EU aims to 
promote a certain democratic model, what the 
elements of such a European model might be, 
what the EU promotes in practice is also widely 
recognised by EU officials, academics and NGOs 
working in the field. The range of EU instruments 
and initiatives in the realm of democracy 
promotion is well-documented, for instance 
election observation missions, declarations and 
initiatives, the European Initiative for Democracy 
and Human Rights (EIDHR), and various other 
funding bodies that support democracy-related 
activities. A democracy promotion strategy should 
consist of more than a series of instruments and 
initiatives, however. While the EU has published 
some general strategic documents about foreign 
policy objectives such as development and 
security, the substance of democracy promotion 
remains blurred. 
Should the EU define the substance of 
democracy promotion?  
At least for those that are truly committed to 
democratic values, the absence of a clear 
understanding of what should be the aim of and 
what should be promoted through EU democracy 
promotion policies is problematic − for two 
reasons. Internally, it is a matter of good policy to 
define policy goals clearly. If the EU is ambiguous 
about what it aims to achieve, it is difficult to 
assess its performance. The Commission 
Communication on Governance in the European 
Consensus on Development, for example, states 
that democratic governance includes issues such 
as the ‘management of migration flows’ and a 
‘climate conducive to private investment’ in the 
same breath as fundamental freedoms of 
expression, information and association. Apart 
from the fact that issues such as migration are not 
part of other conceptualisations of democracy in 
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EU democracy promotion, such as ‘deep 
democracy’, and are not part of the definition of 
democratic governance presented by the EU in the 
earlier White Paper on European Governance, it 
would be rather difficult to sell the effective 
management of migration flows as instances of 
democratisation.  
In addition, the broader strategy has to be spelled 
out clearly. This includes explicit consideration of 
what elements could be considered as supporting 
democracy. For example, projects under the 
banner of Security Sector Reform (e.g. in the 
Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC) and 
Ruanda) have been supported as contributing to 
democracy. In principle, such reforms can 
contribute to democratisation by strengthening 
civilian control over the military and increased 
transparency. However, nowhere is it specified in 
documents on EU democracy promotion, 
including in the new Strategic Framework, how 
questions of security relate to successful 
democratisation. What is more, in the DRC, 
security sector reforms were essentially and 
primarily serving security purposes and the 
aspect of technical support dominated political 
aspects. This is a systematic problem. Back in 
2008, Richard Youngs demanded that the “EU 
should work towards a tightened categorisation of 
what qualifies as democracy aid”.7 
The EU’s haziness with respect to the goal of 
democracy promotion and the steps needed to 
reach this goal allows it to stretch the definition of 
democracy promotion very far; potentially too far. 
This may be beneficial to the EU’s own interests 
since it allows for a flexible interpretation of what 
will (not) be supported under the banner of 
democracy, but as we show in more detail below, 
it may actually be detrimental from a democracy 
promotion perspective. For an actor with a strong 
bureaucratic culture and large budgetary 
resources such as the EU, the existence of a 
transparent definition and resulting 
operationalisation is all the more important.  
Externally, the absence of a definition of 
democracy and a coherent catalogue of what 
constitutes democracy promotion invites 
suspicion that the EU is not truly committed to 
democracy but that it intends to adjust its 
promotion agenda to fit its own commercial or 
                                                     
7 R. Youngs (2008), “Is European Democracy Promotion 
on the Wane?” CEPS Working Document No. 292, p. 14. 
security interests. (Deliberately) vague 
understandings open the door to double 
standards and inconsistencies. The current 
situation is therefore harming the credibility of the 
EU as an international actor.8 This may also 
explain why the United States is sometimes 
preferred by partner countries to the EU: the US 
has more clearly communicated the values it aims 
to support.9 
This does not mean that there should be one tight 
‘EU model of democracy (promotion)’ that is 
rigidly applied to all regions and countries. 
Plurality will certainly always be inherent to the 
EU’s approach given the composition of its 
member states with different traditions and 
models of democracy. Where it allows the EU to 
take ‘ownership’ by partner governments into 
account), and to react swiftly to new situations 
and specific domestic needs in a context of 
eurocrisis and multipolarity where the ‘European 
model’ and the West’s style of liberal democracy 
are being challenged, the EU’s flexibility may 
actually be an advantage. However, pluralism 
cannot be an excuse for ambiguity.  
Critical issues 
Poorly conceptualised notions of what constitutes 
‘democracy’ and its promotion may also lead to 
policies that limit or hinder democratisation. What 
Western democracy promoters have in common is 
the emphasis on free and fair elections as the 
political core of democratic systems. In the past, 
the external democracy promotion policies of the 
EU and other Western donors have been criticised 
for being too narrowly focused on elections while 
neglecting the broader picture. While elections 
should remain an important element of 
democracy promotion policies, it is important to 
look at the whole electoral process, including the 
preconditions and follow-up. More 
fundamentally, an electoralist substance was 
found to fit in well with a neo-liberal conception 
                                                     
8 The EU’s credibility may further be damaged by dubious 
democratic developments within EU member states and 
the EU’s apparent weakness to deal with them, i.e. the 
case of freedom of expression in Hungary or the crisis 
around the suspended president of Romania. The EU’s 
response to the eurocrisis has also been criticised from 
some sides as non-democratic. 
9 M. Kurki (2012), “How the EU Can Adopt a New Type of 
Democracy Support”, FRIDE Working Paper No. 112, pp. 
1-3. 
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of the state whereby state power is confined and 
public control is limited (cf. Crawford 2005: 590-
591, referring to Milton Friedman). In order to 
promote democracy beyond this minimal 
standard, it is necessary to go beyond the electoral 
process and consider other elements of democratic 
systems, such as political rights and so-called 
horizontal accountability (checks and balances in 
the political system) or deliberation (emphasis on 
an open dialogue not jeopardised by power 
relations).10 
In recent years the EU has shown a broader 
interpretation of democracy promotion than its 
earlier electoralist bias. However, the EU’s 
increasingly broad understanding of democracy 
has given rise to new challenges. Supporting 
objectives that are laudable as such may 
nevertheless have adverse consequences for 
democracy promotion policies when their 
relationship with democracy is insufficiently 
conceptualised and operationalised. Below, we 
discuss different critical issues in this regard and 
argue for a mainstreaming of democracy support 
throughout the EU’s external actions. 
The first critical issue concerns the relationship 
between human rights and democracy 
promotion. In EU documents, democracy and 
human rights promotion are often mentioned in 
the same breath without paying attention to their 
relationship. The latest example is the EU Strategic 
Framework and Action Plan on Human Rights 
and Democracy that does not present any 
discussion about how the two objectives relate to 
each other. Also, it is not clear why references to 
human rights appear more than four times as 
often in the text as those to democracy and why 
the subheadings consistently refer to human 
rights only.11 Our research confirms this bias 
towards civil rights over political rights in EU 
democracy promotion in the (pre-Arab Spring) 
Southern Mediterranean countries, Central Asia 
                                                     
10 W. Merkel (2004), “Embedded and Defective 
Democracies”, Democratization, 11(5), pp. 3358; A. Wetzel 
and J. Orbie (2011), “Promoting Embedded Democracy? 
Researching the Substance of EU Democracy Promotion”, 
European Foreign Affairs Review (EFAR), 16(5), pp. 705-725; 
J.S. Dryzek (2009), “Democratization as Deliberative 
Capacity Building”, Comparative Political Studies, 42(11), 
pp. 1379-1402.  
11 See R. Von Meijenfeldt “New EU policy: strong on 
Human Rights, weak on Democracy support“, Blog 
28.06.2012, (http://www.vonmeijenfeldt.eu/?p=1525). 
and Latin America.12 This bias is problematic 
because it concerns a case where the EU may 
easily overstretch the notion of democracy, to the 
point that democracy promotion would be 
‘everywhere and nowhere’ in the EU’s external 
actions. While certain civil rights can be seen as 
directly related to democracy, this is less obvious 
for other human rights such as children’s rights. 
Activities such as the integration of people with 
intellectual disabilities into the workplace can 
hardly count as democracy promotion. 
The second critical issue refers to the promotion 
of horizontal accountability. Since it refers to the 
horizontal separation of powers and to an 
independent judiciary, horizontal accountability is 
closely related to the notion of democracy. 
However, the actual support for this area may 
target foreign policy goals other than 
democratisation, such as the support of business 
and, eventually, the smooth working of the free 
market. For example, it has been argued that 
much of the support in this field to the pre-Arab 
Spring governments in North Africa was aimed at 
facilitating economic liberalisation and a market-
based economy rather than democratic reforms. 
We argue that the EU should be more explicit 
about the intended goals and critically assess 
compatibility with democratisation objectives. 
After all, increasing the capacity of courts in 
authoritarian states without ensuring their 
independence may even be detrimental to 
democratisation. 
Thirdly, the EU now puts a lot of emphasis on 
elements that are not directly related to 
democracy but may support a democratic 
development and may protect democracy from 
shocks and destabilising tendencies. These are 
socio-economic development (including poverty 
reduction, social redistribution and education), 
‘stateness’ (in terms of a functioning bureaucracy, 
                                                     
12 See A. Wetzel and J. Orbie (2011),“With Map and 
Compass on Narrow Paths and Through Shallow Waters: 
Discovering the Substance of EU Democracy Promotion”, 
EFAR, 16(5), pp. 705-725; and the respective articles in A. 
Wetzel and J. Orbie (eds) (2011),“The Substance of EU 
Democracy Promotion”, EFAR, Special Issue, 16(5); Other 
studies came to similar conclusions: F. Bicchi 
(2009),“Democracy Assistance in the Mediterranean: An 
Overview”, Mediterranean Politics, 14(1), p. 71; S. Herrero 
(2009),“A Decade of Democracy Promotion Through the 
European Initiative for Democracy and Human Rights”, 
The EPD Working Papers Series on Democracy Support, 
1/2009:8. 
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good governance and a state monopoly of 
violence) and civil society organisation.13 
Supporting socio-economic development, 
stateness and civil society is not necessarily 
always conducive to democratisation, however. 
While in the best case support for these conditions 
advances democracy in a third country, in the 
worst case it may even bolster an authoritarian 
regime. The problem is that the EU does not – for 
whatever reason – make explicit when and how 
support for the state, civil society and 
development may (or may not) support 
democracy. Instead, it seems to apply an ‘all good 
things go together’ view where different aims are 
grouped without clear conceptual underpinnings.  
The prioritisation of socio-economic development 
over democratisation is a well-known feature of 
EU democracy promotion. Even if the content of 
EU democracy promotion is often (and 
increasingly) more political than it first seems, 
there is still a large ‘developmentalist’ tendency in 
EU policies. The implicit assumption behind this 
seems to be that economic development will 
ultimately lead to democratic reforms and that the 
latter should not necessarily be tackled upfront. 
From this perspective, the EU has been rather 
lenient towards the democratic situation in 
developing countries in Sub-Saharan Africa that 
have been making economic progress, such as 
Uganda, Rwanda, and Ethiopia. This is reflected 
in the practice of budget support. Even apart from 
the fact that the EU has never made explicit its 
developmentalist practices, e.g. by explaining how 
and under which conditions socio-economic 
development might foster democratic systems, its 
merits could also be challenged. For example, 
after the West stabilised Arab regimes when the 
latter faced serious threats of state bankruptcy, 
“Arab regimes proved inventive in 
instrumentalising international funds in order to 
safeguard political power and maintain previous 
structures of material legitimacy”.14 
Another example is the EU's governance agenda. 
The governance concept has various meanings, 
and the EU has added to its conceptualisation by 
means of its own White Paper on European 
Governance. In its external actions, however, the 
EU mostly follows the World Bank’s 
                                                     
13This conceptualisation is based on Merkel, see footnote 7. 
14O. Schlumberger, (2010) Opening Old Bottles in Search 
of New Wine: On Nondemocratic Legitimacy in the 
Middle East. Middle East Critique, 19(3): 246. 
understanding that takes the political regime into 
account but also stresses the management of a 
country’s economic and social resources for 
development and government capacity. 
Understood in an ‘output-oriented’ sense, 
strengthening the administrative capacity of the 
bureaucracy in an authoritarian state may be 
highly problematic. In cases such as Mali and 
Djibouti, where capacity-building programmes 
were meant to enable the ministries to control 
migratory flows into the EU, the assistance is 
completely unrelated to democratisation. In the 
post-Arab Spring countries, the EU should be 
careful not merely to strengthen the capacity of 
key administrative bodies and security 
institutions, but also to focus on democratic 
administrative procedures. In the worst case, 
output-focused governance programmes are even 
counterproductive to democratisation. 
With regard to civil society, the link to 
democratisation is not always as strong as it may 
seem at first sight. Sometimes, support for civil 
society follows a rather instrumental logic and is 
aimed at other objectives than democracy 
promotion. For example, in Sub-Saharan Africa, 
civil society is often promoted with a view to 
furthering the development agenda. EDF-financed 
capacity-building programmes for civil society 
mainly support non-state actors in their roles as 
service providers and contributors to the Country 
Strategy Papers (CSPs). In the Southern 
Mediterranean countries, support to civil society 
has long aimed to increase the effectiveness of the 
authorities and the functioning of the free market. 
Finally, in Ukraine, civil society was often 
supported with a view to approximating 
legislation to the EU’s acquis. Apart from this, 
there are questions about the representativeness of 
civil society. 
In sum, the points made above are not a repetition 
of the frequently heard criticism that democracy 
promotion objectives come into conflict with 
economic or geopolitical interests. Rather, the 
problem that we have identified is much more 
complicated and concerns the inherent tensions 
between laudable external policy objectives such as 
democracy, human rights, civil society promotion 
and socio-economic development. Without clear 
conceptualisations of how these objectives are 
interlinked and under which conditions they 
could be synergistically promoted, the content of 
so-called ‘democracy promotion policies’ risks 
being diluted or even contradicted. The EU should 
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therefore think carefully about how its external 
objective of democracy promotion links both to 
other external policy objectives and to the single 
elements that are usually presented as democracy 
promotion measures. It should establish a more 
reflective democracy promotion policy. This 
should include two dimensions. On the one hand, 
the substance of democracy promotion activities 
should be evaluated ex ante for their effect on 
democratisation. On the other hand, it should also 
include a more comprehensive ‘democracy 
mainstreaming’, whereby policy actions that are 
not explicitly labelled but related to democracy 
promotion, such as trade or development policies, 
are systematically evaluated against their 
potential impact on democratic systems. The 
explicit incorporation of democracy promotion 
into the portfolio of the new EU Special 
Representative for Human Rights could be an 
important step in the development of such a more 
reflective policy. 
Tackling the problems 
This policy brief has argued for a clearer 
definition of what it is that the EU aims to 
promote through its democracy support and how 
this is to be achieved, illustrating the pitfalls of an 
ill-conceptualised policy. Given that the EU 
institutions have so far failed to come up with an 
‘EU Consensus on Democracy’, it would be 
advisable to launch a wider debate on the 
substance of EU democracy promotion, for 
example through a Green Paper on this topic. 
While different views will (and should!) 
undoubtedly continue to circulate, the current 
ambiguity when defining the EU’s policy 
objectives in relation to democratisation should be 
resolved. This is not a call for the EU to reinvent 
the wheel, however. It could also draw on the 
work of other institutions that have more 
expertise, experience and legitimacy in this area 
such as the Council of Europe, the Organisation 
for Security and Cooperation in European, and the 
UN institutions. 
It should be noted that the EU has already tried to 
tackle some of the shortcomings that are 
mentioned in this paper – albeit gradually and 
reluctantly. While recent documents do not bring 
more clarity to the EU’s general conceptualisation 
of democracy support, some specific policies and 
initiatives should be mentioned. First, the EU has 
made some progress towards an embedded focus 
on elections. Second, the EU’s system of general 
budget support is being reformed and will be 
substituted by “Good governance and 
development contracts”. Such contracts could 
only be made with countries respecting the 
fundamental values of the EU, including 
democracy. However, it seems that this will only 
concern general budget support, not sectoral 
budget support. It also remains to be seen how 
and when this linkage between development and 
democracy considerations will be established. 
Specifically, this policy brief leads to the following 
policy-recommendations: 
• The EU should seriously reflect on the 
substance of its democracy promotion policies. 
In this regard, the role of elections, human 
rights, socio-economic development, civil 
society and governance should be 
conceptualised more clearly.  
• This process could be facilitated through a 
Europe-wide debate on this issue, e.g. by 
issuing a Green Paper on the topic. This debate 
would take into account the views of different 
stakeholders, including those from the target 
countries, without neglecting existing 
international standards and agreements.  
• Ongoing reforms of the EU’s democracy 
support policies, such as the focus on the 
whole electoral process and the linkage 
between democracy and development goals, 
should be encouraged and implemented. 
• Institutionally, the EU should establish a 
reflective democracy promotion policy that 
includes ex ante assessments of the substance 
of democracy promotion activities and a more 
comprehensive mainstreaming of the 
substance of democracy promotion across 
different policy sectors. The “Strategic 
Framework and Action Plan on Human Rights 
and Democracy” only takes a small step in this 
direction.  
